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minister from July 20 ro D ecember 31, Smisky simulta-
neously became the last prime minister of the Czech and 
Slovak Federated Republic. Following the division of the 
country on January 1, 1993, Klaus became prime minister 
of cl1eCzech Republic. From 1993 ro 1995 Swiskywas 
minister of transporratio n. In 1995 he became minister 
of health. In February 1997, in an effort ro stave off the 
bankruptcy of rwo prime reaching medical facilities , 
Smisky imroduced controversial cost-curring and consol-
idating measures. 
Bernard Cook 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I 
The Suategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) resulted 
in a treaty limiring antiballistic missile (ABM) sysrems 
and an agreement limiting srraregic offensive arms. These 
accords were signed on May 26, 1972, afrer rwo and a 
half years of negoriation berween the United Stares and 
me USSR. A number of "agreed statements" chat clarified 
specific provisions or pares of the negoriati ng hisrory were 
attached. 
The ABM Treary soughr ro preclude the developmenr 
of narional missile defense systems. This rreary is of un-
limired durarion bur allows either parry the righr ro wirh-
draw on six-months notice if ir believes irs narional in-
reresrs are jeopardized. 
Two ABM deployment areas were allowed for each na-
rion and were so resrrictive chat a nationwide ballistic mis-
sile defense system could nor be developed. Each side was 
allowed a system to defend its capiral and another ro pro-
recr an inrercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch 
sire. These systems must be at least 1,300 kilometers away 
from each ocher, and each could have one hundred inrer-
cepror missil es and one hundred launchers. New genera-
rions of early-warning radars may be deployed, but they 
musr be sited along the periphery of each counrry and 
directed ourward so as nor ro facilitate an ABM defense. 
As agreed, the ABM Treary is reviewed every five years. 
A protocol to this rreary was signed on July 3, 1974, 
reducing the number of ABM deployment areas ro one 
for each nation . The ABM Treary was criticized by con-
servatives in the United States for terminating the Safe-
guard ABM system, which was ro be deployed in rwelve I . ~canons throughout the United States ro protect ICBM 
Sites, and for erasing the U.S. lead in ABM research and 
development. It was further criticized for encouraging the 
Soviet Union to create a counterforce capability that 
threatened U .S. land-based deterrent forces. 
The agreement was to remain in force for five years, 
and was a stopgap measure to limit the offensive strategic 
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arms race while further negotiarions would be ca rried our 
under SALT II. Under this agreement, strategic land-
based ballisric missile launcher , includina d1o e und . r 
b 
construction were frozen at current level . Further, 
submarine-launched ballistic miss ile ( LBMs) ould be 
increased ro grea ter levels on ly if accompanied by the de-
struction of an equal number of older I BM or LBM 
launchers. Soviet strategic force ceiling levels wer set at 
1,618 ICBMs and 950 LBM (740 th n existed). U . . 
strategic force cei ling levels were set at 1,054 1 BMs and 
710 SLBMs (656 chen exi ted). 
Ald10ugh mobile ICBMs, mu.ltiple- indepcndendy-
targetable-reentry-vehicle (MIRV) ballisri missiles, and 
srrategic bomber , of which the United State enjoy d an 
advanrage, were not covered in the lnrerim Agr ement, it 
was criticized for conceding ro the USSR an advantage in 
strategic bal listic missile launchers in return for the co n-
rinuance of Easr-West arms control nego tiat ions. 
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Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II 
Second stage of strategic arms limitation talks (SALT II) 
berween the USSR and the Un ited rates. T he primary 
focus of these talks was the replacement of d1 e SALT I 
Interim Agreemenr of May 26, 1972, wirh a more com-
plete and balanced treary. 
These calks resulted in the signing on June 18, 1979, 
of a Treacy, Protocol , and Joint Statement of Principles 
rhar were never rarified by rhe U.S. Senate. Following the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that year, President Jimmy 
Carrer withdrew the rreary from Senate consideration, 
where ir had come under considerable opposition. The 
Reagan adm inistration, in turn , never resubmitted the 
rreary because of Soviet violations, such as the Krasno-
1196 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
yarsk radar sire and rhe development of rhe SS-25 ICBM, 
and growing tensions as rhe Cold War heightened. 
T he rreary would have provided for an initial overall 
limit of 2,400 srraregic nuclear delivery vehicles for each 
nation and a limit of 1,300 mulriple-independendy-
rarge table-reenrry vehicles (MIRV) carrying ballistic mis-
siles. T he protocol would have banned the deployment 
of air-to-su rface ballistic missi les (AS BMs) and ground-
and sea-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs and SLCMs) 
with ranges in excess of 600 ki lometers, whi le the Joint 
Sraremenr of Principles wou ld have provided for subse-
quent SALT III negoriarions. 
Sri II , rhe SALT II acco rds were observed by borh the 
US R and rhe Uni ted Stares on a vo luntary basis until 
May 1986, when President Ronald Reagan annou nced 
rhar the United Stares would no longer be bound by irs 
cei lings. In rhe meantime, a new round of arms control 
negotiations had already been initiated by rhe Reagan ad-
ministration in July 1982 under rhe Strategic Arms Re-
duction Talks (START I). 
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Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
Anns control talks ( TART I) berween d1e USSR and rhe 
United rates d1ar replaced the rraregicArms Limitation 
Talk ( ALT). T hese talks were carried our from June 
1982 until July 1991 , re ulring in the Treaty Berween me 
United tares and the USSR on the Reduction and Lim-
itat ion of Strategic Offen ive Arms. 
The e talks were initial ly conducted by me United 
Stares wid1 the goal of reducing large numbers of Soviet 
m ul rip le- i ndependen dy- ra rgerable- reen rry-veh icled 
(MIRVed) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 
while ar d1e same rime keeping intact U.S . submarine-
launched ballistic miss il es (SLBM) and ai r-laun h d c e . 
cruise-miss iles-(ALCM)-ba ed strategic forces. Soviet del. 
egares countered d1 ese proposals with their own demands, 
which included a total ban on all long-range cruise m~. 
siles. These ralks were broken off by rhe USSR in No-
vember 1983. They resumed on ly in March 1985, under 
rhe bilateral Nuclea r and Space Talks forum, afreran eas. 
ing of tensions over U.S. basing of ground-launched 
cruise missil es (GLCMs) and Pershing lis in Wesrern Eu. 
rope. The START I Treaty was finally reached on july 
31 , 1991. The Russ ian Federation, Republic of Belarus 
Ukraine, and Kazakhsran-four successor states of th; 
former Soviet Union-became parries to this treaty with 
rhe sign ing of me Lisbon Protocol in May 1992. 
In this rreary an agreed limit of 1,600 "deployed"stra· 
regie nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) and 6,000 "ac· 
counrable" warheads (that is, warheads on the SNDYs) 
was set. For these warheads, lim irs were set at 4,900 for 
deployed I CBMs/SLBMs, 1, 100 for deployed mobile 
ICBMs, and 1,540 for deployed heavy ICBMs. Reduc· 
rions to rhe agreed upon limi rs were to rake place in three 
phases over rhe course of seven years. The rreary itself 
would be in force for fifteen years, at me end of which 
an option for extension exists. 
The first phase of reductions rook place no later than 
thirty-six months after treaty entry into force and wit-
nessed a lowering of SNDVs to 2,100 and warheads ro 
9,150 (of which only 8,050 could be deployed on 
ICBMs/SLBMs). The second phase of reductions wa.s 
slated to rake effect no later than sixty months after the 
treaty's entry inro force and would acllieve a lowering of 
SNDVs to 1,900 and warheads to 7,950 (of which only 
6,750 could be deployed on ICBMs/SLBMs). The third 
phase of reductions would rake place no later than eighty· 
four months after the treaty's entry into force and rep· 
resenrs the target numbers agreed upon in mis accord. 
Separate agreemenrs to this treaty limited SLCMs with 
ranges above 600 kilometers at 800 for each nation and 
lim ited Soviet Backfire bombers to 500. 
Three major criticisms of the START I Treaty exist. 
First, it fails to rake into accounr immense Soviet ICBMl 
SLBM reload capabilities (i .e., srraregic SNDV reserves). 
Second, rhe lack of parity berween Soviet and U.S. 
SNDVs was nor given consideration. The Soviet ICBM 
force was far more lethal d1an irs U.S. counterpart, yet 
born sides' ICBMs were counted equally. Lasr, me co~­
cepr of "accounrable" warheads deployed on SNDVs. JS 
Aawed. Photoreconnaissance suggests rhar me SovJet 
SS-18 force, whjch represented most of me Soviet's !CB~ 
- L d · h adili· 
u1row weight, was capable of being ourfitte wrr 
tional warheads per missile in violation of rreary rerrns. 
